Human institutions-ways of organizing activities-affect the resilience of the environment. Locally evolved institutional arrangements governed by stable communities and buffered from outside forces have sustained resources successfully for centuries, although they often fail when rapid change occurs. Ideal conditions for governance are increasingly rare. Critical problems, such as transboundary pollution, tropical deforestation, and climate change, are at larger scales and involve nonlocal influences. Promising strategies for addressing these problems include dialogue among interested parties, officials, and scientists; complex, redundant, and layered institutions; a mix of institutional types; and designs that facilitate experimentation, learning, and change.
In 1968, Hardin (1) drew attention to two human factors that drive environmental change. The first factor is the increasing demand for natural resources and environmental services, stemming from growth in human population and per capita resource consumption. The second factor is the way in which humans organize themselves to extract resources from the environment and eject effluents into it-what social scientists refer to as institutional arrangements. Hardin's work has been highly influential (2) but has long been aptly criticized as oversimplified (3-6).
Hardin's oversimplification was twofold: He claimed that only two state-established institutional arrangements-centralized government and private property-could sustain commons over the long run, and he presumed that resource users were trapped in a commons dilemma, unable to create solutions (7) (8) (9) . He missed the point that many social groups, including the herders on the commons that provided the metaphor for his analysis, have struggled successfully against threats of resource degradation by developing and maintaining self-governing institutions (3, (10) (11) (12) (13) . Although these institutions have not always succeeded, neither have Hardin's preferred alternatives of private or state ownership.
In the absence of effective governance institutions at the appropriate scale, natural resources and the environment are in peril from increasing human population, consumption, and deployment of advanced technologies for resource use, all of which have reached unprecedented levels. For example, it is estimated that "the global ocean has lost more than 90% of large predatory fishes" with an 80% decline typically occurring "within 15 years of industrialized exploitation" (14) . The threat of massive ecosystem degradation results from an interplay among ocean ecologies, fishing technologies, and inadequate governance.
Inshore fisheries are similarly degraded where they are open access or governed by top-down national regimes, leaving local and regional officials and users with insufficient autonomy and understanding to design effective institutions (15, 16) . For example, the degraded inshore ground fishery in Maine is governed by top-down rules based on models that were not credible among users. As a result, compliance has been relatively low and there has been strong resistance to strengthening existing restrictions. This is in marked contrast to the Maine lobster fishery, which has been governed by formal and informal user institutions that have strongly influenced state-level rules that restrict fishing. The result has been credible rules with very high levels of compliance (17) (18) (19) . A comparison of the landings of ground fish and lobster since 1980 is shown in Fig. 1 . The rules and high levels of compliance related to lobster appear to have prevented the destruction of this fishery but probably are not responsible for the sharp rise in abundance and landings after 1986.
Resources at larger scales have also been successfully protected through appropriate international governance regimes such as the Montreal Protocol on stratospheric ozone and the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine Agreements (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) . Figure 2 compares the trajectory of atmospheric concentrations of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) with that of carbon dioxide since 1982. The Montreal Protocol, the centerpiece of the international agreements on ozone depletion, was signed in 1987. Before then, ODS concentrations were increasing faster than those of CO 2 ; the increases slowed by the early 1990s and the concentration appears to have stabilized in recent years. The international treaty regime to reduce the anthropogenic impact on stratospheric ozone is widely considered an example of a successful effort to protect the global commons. In contrast, international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas concentrations have not yet had an impact.
Knowledge from an emerging science of human-environment interactions, sometimes called human ecology or the "second environmental science" (25, 26) , is clarifying the characteristics of institutions that facilitate or undermine sustainable use of environmental resources under particular conditions (6, 27) . The knowledge base is strongest with smallscale ecologies and institutions, where long time series exist on many successes and failures. It is now developing for larger-scale systems. In this review, we address what science has learned about governing the commons and why it is always a struggle (28) .
Why a Struggle?
Devising ways to sustain the earth's ability to support diverse life, including a reasonable quality of life for humans, involves making tough decisions under uncertainty, complexity, and substantial biophysical constraints as well as conflicting human values and interests. Devising effective governance systems is akin to a coevolutionary race. A set of rules crafted to fit one set of socioecological conditions can erode as social, economic, and technological developments increase the potential for human damage to ecosystems and even to the biosphere itself. Furthermore, humans devise ways of evading governance rules. Thus, successful commons governance requires that rules evolve.
Effective commons governance is easier to achieve when (i) the resources and use of the resources by humans can be monitored, and the information can be verified and understood at relatively low cost (e.g., trees are easier to monitor than fish, and lakes are easier to monitor than rivers) (29) ; (ii) rates of change in resources, resource-user populations, technology, and economic and social conditions are moderate (30) (31) (32) ; (iii) communities maintain frequent face-to-face communication and dense social networks-sometimes called social capital-that increase the potential for trust, allow people to express and see emotional reactions to distrust, and lower the cost of monitoring behavior and inducing rule compliance (33) (34) (35) (36) ; (iv) outsiders can be excluded at relatively low cost from using the resource (new entrants add to the harvesting pressure and typically lack understanding of the rules); and (v) users support effective monitoring and rule enforcement (37) (38) (39) . Few settings in the world are characterized by all of these conditions. The challenge is to devise institutional arrangements that help to establish such conditions or, as we discuss below, meet the main challenges of governance in the absence of ideal conditions (6, 40, 41).
Selective Pressures
The characteristics of resources and social interaction in many subsistence societies present favorable conditions for the evolution of effective self-governing resource institutions (13) . Hundreds of documented examples exist of long-term sustainable resource use in such communities as well as in more economically advanced communities with effective, local, self-governing rights, but there are also many failures (6, 11, (42) (43) (44) . As human communities have expanded, the selective pressures on environmental governance institutions increasingly have come from broad influences. Commerce has become regional, national, and global, and institutions at all of these levels have been created to enable and regulate trade, transportation, competition, and conflict (45, 46) . These institutions shape environmental impact, even if they are not designed with that intent. They also provide mechanisms for environmental governance (e.g., national laws) and part of the social context for local efforts at environmental governance. Larger scale governance may authorize local control, help it, hinder it, or override it (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) . Now, every local place is strongly influenced by global dynamics (48, (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) .
The most important contemporary environmental challenges involve systems that are intrinsically global (e.g., climate change) or are tightly linked to global pressures (e.g., timber production for the world market) and that require governance at levels from the global all the way down to the local (48, 58, 59) . These situations often feature environmental outcomes spatially displaced from their causes and hard-tomonitor, larger scale economic incentives that may not be closely aligned with the condition of local ecosystems. Also, differentials in power within user groups or across scales allow some to ignore rules of commons use or to reshape the rules in their own interest, such as when global markets reshape demand for local resources (e.g., forests) in ways that swamp the ability of locally evolved institutions to regulate their use (60) (61) (62) .
The store of governance tools and ways to modify and combine them is far greater than often is recognized (6, (63) (64) (65) . Global and national environmental policy frequently ignores community-based governance and traditional tools, such as informal communication and sanctioning, but these tools can have significant impact (63, 66) . Further, no single broad type of ownership-government, private, or community-uniformly succeeds or fails to halt major resource deterioration, as shown for forests in multiple countries (supporting online material text, figs. S1 to S5, and table S1).
Requirements of Adaptive Governance in Complex Systems
Providing information. Environmental governance depends on good, trustworthy information about stocks, flows, and processes within the resource systems being governed, as well as about the human-environment interactions affecting those systems. This information must be congruent in scale with environmental events and decisions (48, 67) . Highly aggregated information may ignore or average out local information that is important in identifying future problems and developing solutions.
For example, in 2002, a moratorium on all fishing for northern cod was declared by the Canadian government after a collapse of this valuable fishery. An earlier near-collapse had led Canada to declare a 200-mile zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction in 1977 (68, 69) . Considerable optimism existed during the 1980s that the stocks, as estimated by fishery scientists, were rebuilding. Consequently, generous total catch limits were established for northern cod and other ground fish, the number of licensed fishers was allowed to increase considerably, and substantial government subsidies were allocated for new vessels (70) . What went wrong? There were a variety of informationrelated problems including: (i) treating all northern cod as a single stock instead of recognizing distinct populations with different characteristics, (ii) ignoring the variability of year classes of northern cod, (iii) focusing on offshore-fishery landing data rather than inshore data to "tune" the stock assessment, and (iv) ignoring inshore fishers who were catching ever-smaller fish and doubted the validity of stock assessments (70) (71) (72) . This experience illustrates the need to collect and model both local and aggregated information about resource conditions and to use it in making policy at the appropriate scales. Information also must be congruent with decision makers' needs in terms of timing, content, and form of presentation (73) (74) (75) . Informational systems that simultaneously meet high scientific standards and serve ongoing needs of decision makers and users are particularly useful. Information must not overload the capacity of users to assimilate it. Systems that adequately characterize environmental conditions or human activities with summary indicators such as prices for products or emission permits, or certification of good environmental performance can provide valuable signals as long as they are attentive to local as well as aggregate conditions (76) (77) (78) .
Effective governance requires not only factual information about the state of the environment and human actions but also information about uncertainty and values. Scientific understanding of coupled human-biophysical systems will always be uncertain because of inherent unpredictability in the systems and because the science is never complete (79) . Decision makers need information that characterizes the types and magnitudes of this uncertainty, as well as the nature and extent of scientific ignorance and disagreement (80) . Also, because every environmental decision requires tradeoffs, knowledge is needed about individual and social values and about the effects of decisions on various valued outcomes. For many environmental systems, local and easily captured values (e.g., the market value of lumber) have to be balanced against global, diffuse, and hardto-capture values (e.g., biodiversity and the capability of humans and ecosystems to adapt to unexpected events). Finding ways to measure and monitor the outcomes for such varied values in the face of globalization is a major informational challenge for governance.
Dealing with conflict. Sharp differences in power and in values across interested parties make conflict inherent in environmental choices. Indeed, conflict resolution may be as important a motivation for designing resource institutions as is concern with the resources themselves (81) . People bring varying perspectives, interests, and fundamental philosophies to problems of environmental governance (74, (82) (83) (84) , and their conflicts, if they do not escalate to the point of dysfunction, can spark learning and change (85, 86) .
For example, a broadly participatory process was used to examine alternative strategies for regulating the Mississippi River and its tributaries (87) . A dynamic model was constructed with continuous input by the Corps of Engineers, the Fish and Wildlife Service, local landowners, environmental groups, and academics from multiple disciplines. After extensive model development and testing against past historical data, most stakeholders had high confidence in the explanatory power of the model. Consensus was reached over alternative management options, and the resulting policies generated far less conflict than had existed at the outset (88) .
Delegating authority to environmental ministries does not always resolve conflicts satisfactorily, so governments are experimenting with various governance approaches to complement managerial ones. They range from ballots and polls, where engagement is passive and participants interact minimally, to adversarial processes that allow parties to redress grievances through formal legal procedures, to various experiments with intense interaction and deliberation aimed at negotiating decisions or allowing parties in potential conflict to provide structured input to them through participatory processes (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) .
Inducing rule compliance. Effective governance requires that the rules of resource use are generally followed, with reasonable standards for tolerating modest violations. It is generally most effective to impose modest sanctions on first offenders, and gradually increase the severity of sanctions for those who do not learn from their first or second encounter (39, 94) . Community-based institutions often use informal strategies for achieving compliance that rely on participants' commitment to rules and subtle social sanctions. Whether enforcement mechanisms are formal or informal, those who impose them must be seen as effective and legitimate by resource users or resistance and evasion will overwhelm the commons governance strategy.
Much environmental regulation in complex societies has been "command and control." Governments require or prohibit specific actions or technologies, with fines or jail terms possible for punishing rule breakers. If sufficient resources are made available for monitoring and enforcement, such approaches are effective. But when governments lack the will or resources to protect "protected areas" (95-97), when major environmental damage comes from hard-to-detect "nonpoint sources," and when the need is to encourage innovation in behaviors or technologies rather than to require or prohibit familiar ones, command and control approaches are less effective. They are also economically inefficient in many circumstances (98) (99) (100) .
Financial instruments can provide incentives to achieve compliance with environmental rules. In recent years, market-based systems of tradable environmental allowances (TEAs) that define a limit to environmental withdrawals or emissions and permit free trade of allocated allowances under those limits have become popular (76, 101, 102) . TEAs are one of the bases for the Kyoto agreement on climate change.
Economic theory and experience in some settings suggest that these mechanisms have substantial advantages over command and control (103) (104) (105) (106) . TEAs have exhibited good environmental performance and economic efficiency in the U.S. Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Market intended to reduce the prevalence of acid rain (107, 108) and the Lead Phasedown Program aimed at reducing the level of lead emissions (109) . Crucial variables that differentiate these highly successful programs from less successful ones, such as chlorofluorocarbon production quota trading and the early EPA emission trading programs, include: (i) the level of predictability of the stocks and flows, (ii) the number of users or producers who are regulated, (iii) the heterogeneity of the regulated users, and (iv) clearly defined and fully exchangeable permits (110).
TEAs, like all institutional arrangements, have notable limitations. TEA regimes tend to leave unprotected those resources not specifically covered by trading rules (e.g., bycatch of noncovered fish species) (111) and to suffer when monitoring is difficult (e.g., under the Kyoto protocol, the question of whether geologically sequestered carbon will remain sequestered). Problems can also occur with the initial allocation of allowances, especially when historic users, who may be called on to change their behavior most, have disproportionate power over allocation decisions (76, 101) . TEAs and community-based systems appear to have opposite strengths and weaknesses (101) , suggesting that institutions that combine aspects of both systems may work better than either approach alone. For example, the fisheries tradable permit system in New Zealand has added comanagement institutions to complement the market institutions (102, 112) .
Voluntary approaches and those based on information disclosure have only begun to receive careful scientific attention as supplements to other tools (63, 77, (113) (114) (115) . Success appears to depend on the existence of incentives that benefit leaders in volunteering over laggards and on the simultaneous use of other strategies, particularly ones that create incentives for compliance (77, (116) (117) (118) . Difficulties of sanctioning pose major problems for international agreements (119) (120) (121) .
Providing infrastructure. The importance of physical and technological infrastructure is often ignored. Infrastructure, including technology, determines the degree to which a commons can be exploited (e.g., water works and fishing technology), the extent to which waste can be reduced in resource use, and the degree to which resource conditions and the behavior of humans users can be effectively monitored. Indeed, the ability to choose institutional arrangements depends in part on infrastructure. In the absence of barbed-wire fences, for example, enforcing private property rights on grazing lands is expensive, but with barbed wire fences, it is relatively cheap (122) . Effective communication and transportation technologies are also of immense importance. Fishers who observe an unauthorized boat or harvesting technology can use a radio or cellular phone to alert others to illegal actions (123) . Infrastructure also affects the links between local commons and regional and global systems. Good roads can provide food in bad times but can also open local resources to global markets, creating demand for resources that cannot be used locally (124) . Institutional infrastructure is also important, including research, social capital, and multilevel rules, to coordinate between local and larger levels of governance (48, 125, 126) .
Be prepared for change. Institutions must be designed to allow for adaptation because some current understanding is likely to be wrong, the required scale of organization can shift, and biophysical and social systems change. Fixed rules are likely to fail because they place too much confidence in the current state of knowledge, whereas systems that guard against the low probability, high consequence possibilities and allow for change may be suboptimal in the short run but prove wiser in the long run. This is a principal lesson of adaptive management research (31, 127) .
Strategies for Meeting the Requirements of Adaptive Governance
The general principles for robust governance institutions for localized resources (Fig. 3) are well established as a result of multiple empirical studies (13, 39, (128) (129) (130) (131) (132) (133) (134) (135) (136) (137) . Many of these also appear to be applicable to regional and global resources (138) , although they are less well tested at those scales. Three of them seem to be particularly relevant for problems at larger scales.
Analytic deliberation. Well-structured dialogue involving scientists, resource users, and interested publics, and informed by analysis of key information about environmental and human-environment systems, appears critical. Such analytic deliberation (74, 139, 140) provides improved information and the trust in it that is essential for information to be used effectively, builds social capital, and can allow for change and deal with inevitable conflicts well enough to produce consensus on governance rules. The negotiated 1994 U.S. regulation on disinfectant by-products in water that reached an interim consensus, including a decision to collect new information and reconsider the rule on that basis (74) , is an excellent example of this approach.
Nesting. Institutional arrangements must be complex, redundant, and nested in many layers (32, 141, 142) . Simple strategies for governing the world's resources that rely exclusively on imposed markets or one-level, centralized command and control and that eliminate apparent redundancies in the name of efficiency have been tried and have failed. Catastrophic failures often have resulted when central governments have exerted sole authority over resources. Examples include the massive environmental degradation and impoverishment of local people in Indonesian Borneo (95) , the increased rate of loss and fragmentation of high-quality habitat that occurred after creating the Wolong Nature Reserve in China (143) , and the closing of the northern cod fishery along the eastern coast of Canada partly attributable to the excessive quotas granted by the Canadian government (70) .
Institutional variety. Governance should employ mixtures of institutional types (e.g., hierarchies, markets, and community selfgovernance) that employ a variety of decision rules to change incentives, increase information, monitor use, and induce compliance (6, 63, 117) . Innovative rule evaders can have more trouble with a multiplicity of rules than with a single type of rule.
Conclusion
Is it possible to govern such critical commons as the oceans and the climate? We remain guardedly optimistic. Thirty-five years ago it seemed that the "tragedy of the commons" was inevitable everywhere not owned privately or by a government. Systematic multidisciplinary research has, however, shown that a wide diversity of adaptive governance systems have been effective stewards of many resources. Sustained research coupled to an explicit view of national and international policies as experiments can yield the scientific knowledge necessary to design appropriate adaptive institutions.
Sound science is necessary for commons governance, but not sufficient. Too many strategies for governance of local commons are designed in capital cities or by donor agencies in ignorance of the state of the science and local conditions. The results are often tragic, but at least these tragedies are local. As the human footprint on the Earth enlarges (144) , humanity is challenged to develop and deploy understanding of largescale commons governance quickly enough to avoid the large-scale tragedies that will otherwise ensue. V I E W P O I N T
Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources

Jules Pretty
The proposition that natural resources need protection from the destructive actions of people is widely accepted. Yet communities have shown in the past and increasingly today that they can collaborate for long-term resource management. The term social capital captures the idea that social bonds and norms are critical for sustainability. Where social capital is high in formalized groups, people have the confidence to invest in collective activities, knowing that others will do so too. Some 0.4 to 0.5 million groups have been established since the early 1990s for watershed, forest, irrigation, pest, wildlife, fishery, and microfinance management. These offer a route to sustainable management and governance of common resources.
From Malthus to Hardin and beyond, analysts and policy-makers have widely come to accept that natural resources need to be protected from the destructive, yet apparently rational, actions of people. The compelling logic is that people inevitably harm natural resources as they use them, and more people therefore do more harm. The likelihood of this damage being greater where natural resources are commonly owned is further increased by suspicions that people tend to free-ride, both by overusing and underinvesting in the maintenance of resources. As our global numbers have increased, and as incontrovertible evidence of harm to water, land, and atmospheric resources has emerged, so the choices seem to be starker. Either we regulate to prevent further harm, in Hardin's words (1), to engage in mutual coercion mutually agreed upon, or we press ahead with enclosure and privatization to increase the likelihood that resources will be more carefully managed. These concepts have influenced many policy-makers and practitioners. They have Department of Biological Sciences, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK. E-mail: jpretty@essex. ac.uk
